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Abstract 
Traditional cryptography based authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocols expose the problems of 
efficiency and privacy since signature-then-encryption is heavy to wireless communication special for flexible 
dynamic deployment, i.e., wireless mesh networks, wireless sensor networks, mobile ad hoc networks, etc., in 
computational cost and communicational overhead and traditional digital signature allows anyone to verify its 
validity using the corresponding public key. In this paper, we propose a signcryption based light weight key 
exchange protocol named SLWKE which can provide resistance to traditional attacks, i.e., eavesdropping, deducing, 
replaying, interleaving, forging and repudiating, and unknown key-share attack and save computational cost by three 
modular calculations, i.e., one modular inversion, one modular addition and one modular multiplicative, included in a 
signature s and communicational overhead by secure length of |q| in comparison to signcryption based direct key 
exchange using a time-stamp protocol termed DKEUTS. 
 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of [name organizer] 
Keywords:  Security; Privacy; Signcryption; Key exchange. 
1.  Introduction 
The openness of wireless environment and the pursuit of flexible dynamic deployment for wireless 
networks, i.e., wireless mesh networks, wireless sensor networks, mobile ad hoc networks, etc., make 
security and efficiency critical concerns. The special field communications generally require secure and 
light weight key exchange protocols since the wireless backbone nodes and wireless client nodes show 
distinct mobility and power constrains. Diffie-Hellman protocol is the most prominent representative of 
key exchange protocols [1]. Traditional cryptography based authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange 
protocols expose the problems of efficiency and privacy since signature-then-encryption is heavy to the 
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special field communications in computational cost and communicational overhead and traditional digital 
signature allows anyone to verify its validity using the corresponding public key. 
In this paper, we propose a signcryption based light weight key exchange protocol named as 
SLWKE adaptive to the special field communications with the privacy property that only the designated 
receiver can unsigncrypt the signcrypted text and verify its validity, anyone else can do nothing even 
though he holds the participants’ corresponding public keys. We analyze the properties of security and 
efficiency in comparison to Zheng’s direct key exchange using a time-stamp protocol termed as 
DKEUTS. The results of analysis show that the protocol SLWKE can provide resistance to traditional 
attacks and unknown key-share attack and save computational cost by three modular calculations 
included in a signature s and communicational overhead by secure length of |q|. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review the related work at 
signcryption based key exchange protocol. In Section III, we present signcryption based light weight key 
exchange protocol named SLWKE. In Section IV, we analyze the properties of security and efficiency of 
SLWKE in comparison to DKEUTS and SAKE. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section V. 
2.  Related Work 
In 1997, Zheng proposed the concept of signcryption [2] [3] that simultaneously fulfills both the 
functions of signature and encryption in a logically single step and shows a cost significantly lower than 
that required by signature followed by encryption with the special properties that only the designated 
receiver can unsigncrypt the signcrypted text and verify its validity, anyone else can not do this correctly 
even though he holds the participants’ corresponding public keys. 
Zheng proposed signcryption based key transport protocols termed as DKTUN (Direct Key Transport 
Using a Nonce) and DKTUTS (Direct Key Transport Using a Time-Stamp) [4] over an ATM network 
where the protocols are compact, efficient and authenticated key establishment ones with the properties of 
short packet, unforgeability and non-repudiation. 
Zheng then applied the DKTUN and DKTUTS to key exchange and proposed DKEUN (Direct Key 
Exchange Using a Nonce) protocol and DKEUTS (Direct Key Exchange Using a Time-Stamp) protocol 
[5]. In comparison to traditional cryptography based key exchange protocols, the DKEUN and DKEUTS 
protocols show better efficiency in computational cost and communicational overhead along with privacy 
protection. 
Kim proposed signcryption based secure authenticated key exchange protocol termed as SAKE and 
signcryption based elliptic curve secure authenticated key exchange protocol termed as EC-SAKE [6]. In 
comparison to DKEUN and DKEUTS protocols, the SAKE and EC-SAKE protocols show improvement 
in computational complexity and communicational performance. 
Yavuz proposed a Hierarchical Multi-Tier adaptive ad-hoc network security protocol based on 
SIgncryption type key exchange Schemes termed HIMUTSIS [7] to address security problems in tactical 
military MANETs (Mobile Ad-hoc Networks). In HIMUTSIS, the key management scheme provides 
flexibility and reduces cryptographic workload of the military MANETs using DKEUTS protocol. 
Key exchange protocol requires both participants involved to exchange key materials. In the result, a 
shared secret key is derived from joint key materials from the both participants. Secure and light weight 
key exchange protocols are highly pursued features in wireless communication special for flexible 
dynamic deployment, i.e., wireless mesh networks, wireless sensor networks, mobile ad hoc networks, 
etc. We will discuss the properties of security and efficiency of the signcryption based key exchange 
protocols of DKEUTS, SAKE and SLWKE. 
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3.  Signcryption based Key Exchange Protocols 
3.1Assumptions 
In the following discussions, we assume that the system parameters for discrete logarithm 
signcryption have been properly set up and both participants, Alice, the initiator, and Bob, the responder, 
have already obtained the other’s public key. Parameters for discrete logarithm signcryption are described 
as follows: 
p: a large prime; 
q: a large prime factor of p-1; 
g: an integer with order q modulo p chosen randomly from [1, …, p-1]; 
hash: a one-way hash function whose output has at least 128 bits; 
KH: a keyed one-way hash function; 
(Ek, Dk): symmetric valuable encryption and decryption algorithms with a key k;
xa: Alice’s private key, chosen uniformly at random from [1, …, q-1]; 
ya: Alice’s public key )mod( pgy axa  ; 
xb: Bob’s private key, chosen uniformly at random from [1, …, q-1]; 
yb: Bob’s public key )mod( pgy bxb  . 
3.2Direct Key Exchange Using a Time-Stamp Protocol 
Zheng’s direct key exchange using a time-stamp protocol termed as DKEUTS uses a time-stamp in 
guaranteeing freshness. The initiating process by Alice to Bob using discrete logarithm signcryption is 
described as follows: 
x Pick x uniformly at random from [1, …, q-1] and let )mod(),( 21 pyhashkk
x
b .  
x Encrypt ),(
1
TSkeyEc k  with the key k1. 
x Compute signature ),,(
2
etcTSkeyKHr k  and qxrxs a mod)/(   with the key k2. 
x Send to Bob the signcrypted text {c, r, s}. 
The responding process starts when Bob receives the signcrypted text {c, r, s}. The responding 
process by Bob to Alice using discrete logarithm signcryption is described as follows: 
x Recover )mod)((),( 21 pgyhashkk b
xsr
a
 .  
x Decrypt )(),(
1
cDTSkey k  with the key k1. 
x Accept key as a valid secret material originated from Alice only if TS is fresh and 
),,(
2
etcTSkeyKH k  is identical to r. Otherwise discard the signcrypted text {c, r, s} and stop the key 
exchange proceeding.  
x Pick x* uniformly at random from [1, …, q-1] and let )mod(),(
**
2
*
1 pyhashkk
x
a  since key is valid.  
x Encrypt ),( *** *
1
TSkeyEc
k
  with the key *1k . 
x Compute signature ),,,( *** *
2
etckeyTSkeyKHr
k
  and qxrxs b mod)/(
***   with the key *2k . 
x Send to Alice the signcrypted text {c*, r*, s*}. 
The key verification of {c*, r*, s*} by Alice to Bob using discrete logarithm signcryption is described 
as follows: 
x Recover )mod)((),(
***
2
*
1 pgyhashkk
axsr
b
 . 
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x Decrypt )(),( *** *
1
cDTSkey
k
  with the key *1k . 
x Accept key* as a valid secret material originated from Bob only if TS* is fresh and  
),,,( ***
2
etckeyTSkeyKH
k
 is identical to r*. Otherwise discard the signcrypted text {c*, r*, s*} and 
stop the key exchange proceeding.  
Over here, notations key and key* may be used to derive a shared secret key, notations TS and TS* 
represent current time-stamps, notation etc may be composed of both participants’ identifiers, public key 
certificates or other supplementary information, and )(* TSMACtag keykey  is optional for key 
confirmation if necessary. 
3.3Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol 
Kim’s secure authenticated key exchange protocol termed as SAKE depends on discrete logarithm 
signcryption to ensure security. The initiating process by Alice to Bob using discrete logarithm 
signcryption is described as follows: 
x Pick x uniformly at random from [1, …, q-1] and let )mod(),( 121 pyHkk
x
b .  
x Compute xgkBAHm  ),,( 12 . 
x Compute )(
2
mKHr k  and qxrxs a mod)/(   with the key k2. 
x Send to Bob the signcrypted text {m, r, s}. 
 The responding process by Bob to Alice using discrete logarithm signcryption is described as 
follows: 
x Recover )mod)((),( 121 pgyHkk b
xsr
a
 .  
x Discard the signcrypted text {m, r, s} and stop the key exchange proceeding if rmKH k z)(2 . 
Otherwise proceed. 
x Pick y uniformly at random from [1, …, q-1] and compute yg P , xg
kBAH
m  
),,( 12
, yxg )( V  
and )(
1
VG kKH . 
x Send },{ GP  to Alice.  
        When Alice receives the message },{ GP , she computes xPV   and accepts V  only if )(
1
VkKH  is 
identical to G . When Alice accepts V  as a valid key material, Alice and Bob compute the shared secret 
key ),,,,,( 213 PVkkBAHk   each other. Over Here, H1, H2 and H3 are one-way hash functions and 
notations A and B indicate the identifications of Alice and Bob, respectively. 
3.4Signcryption based Light Weight Key Exchange Protocol 
The discrete logarithm signcryption based light weight key exchange protocol named as SLWKE is 
described as follows. Over there, notations bind_a and bind_b contain data that identify Alice and Bob, 
respectively, i.e., the public keys or the public key certificates. Notations TQ and TQ* may contain time-
varying quantities such as a nonce or a time-stamp or both. Notations gx and gy are secret materials for 
Alice and Bob to derive a shared secret key gxy=(gx)y=(gy)x based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange. 
The initiating process by Alice to Bob using discrete logarithm signcryption is described as follows: 
x Pick x uniformly at random from [1, …, q-1] and let )mod( pyhashk xb . Split k into k1 and k2 
with appropriate length. 
x Encrypt ),_,(
1
TQabindgEc xk  with the key k1. 
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x Compute signature ),_,(
2
TQabindgKHr xk  and qxrxs a mod)/(   with the key k2. 
x Send to Bob the signcrypted text {c, r, s}. 
        The responding process starts when Bob receives the signcrypted text {c, r, s}. The responding 
process by Bob to Alice using discrete logarithm signcryption is described as follows: 
x Recover )mod)(( pgyhashk bxsra
  from {r, s, g, p, ya, xb}. Split k into k1 and k2. 
x Decrypt )(),_,(
1
cDTQabindg k
x   with the key k1. 
x Accept gx as a valid secret material originated from Alice only if TQ is fresh and 
),_,(
2
TQabindgKH xk  is identical to r. Otherwise discard the signcrypted text {c, r, s} and stop 
the key exchange proceeding. 
x Pick y uniformly at random from [1, …, q-1] and let yxg )( V  as a shared secret key with Alice 
since gx is valid. 
x Encrypt ),_,( **
1
TQbbindgEc yk  with the key k1. 
x Compute ),,_,( **
2
VTQbbindgKHr yk  with the key k2. 
x Send to Alice the encrypted text {c*, r*}. 
The key verification of {c*, r*} by Alice to Bob is described as follows: 
x Decrypt )(),_,( **
1
cDTQbbindg k
y   with the key k1. 
x Accept gy as a valid secret material originated from Bob only if TQ* is fresh and 
))(,,_,( *
2
xyy
k gTQbbindgKH  is identical to r
*. Otherwise discard the encrypted text {c*, r*} and 
stop the key exchange proceeding. 
In the end, Alice and Bob possess a shared secret key gxy=(gx)y=(gy)x.   
4.  Security and Efficiency 
The initiating process by Alice to Bob in SLWKE is identical to DKEUTS, however, the responding 
process by Bob to Alice in SLWKE is evidently different from DKEUTS where the signcryption method 
gives place to a symmetric encryption method shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. 
4.1Security Consideration 
Typical attacks include eavesdropping, deducing, replaying, interleaving, forging and repudiating 
and unknown key-share attack which is an attack whereby an entity A ends up believing she shares a key 
with B, and although this is in fact the case, B mistakenly believes the key is instead shared with an entity 
E  A given in [8]. 
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Considering the protocol SAKE, ),,( 12 kBAH  included in 
xgkBAHm  ),,( 12  can be omitted if P  can 
be sent directly from Bob to Alice since obtaining the secret values of x and y from gx and gy must face 
the difficult problem of discrete logarithm. The case that identifiers of Alice and Bob can not be sent with 
key materials in responding process will confront SAKE with the unknown key-share attack. 
Countermeasures. In the protocol SLWKE, signcryption with the properties of unforgeability, non-
repudiation and confidentiality and encryption can prevent the contents from being disclosed to a third 
party other than Alice and Bob, independently randomly fresh values can resist deducing and replaying, 
and hash and keyed hash functions can withstand interleaving. With the forgery aspect, only Bob can 
create a responding message correctly except for the initiator Alice since only Bob can work out the keys 
k1 and k2. 
 
Fig. 1 The key exchange of DKEUTS. 
 
Fig.  2 The key exchange of SLWKE. 
Consider the unknown key-share attack against the responder Bob. An attacker Eve intercepts the 
message {c, r, s} sent from Alice to Bob and attempts to replace the identity of Alice with Eve. But Eve 
can not arrive at his aim since the identity of Alice included in bind_a is protected using signcryption and 
the signature {r, s} is derived from bind_a. Consider the unknown key-share attack against the initiator 
Alice. Neither do Eve. 
4.2Efficiency Consideration 
Low computation and low communication are highly pursued features in key exchange research in 
wireless dynamic networks, i.e., wireless mesh networks, wireless sensor networks, mobile ad hoc 
networks, etc. In comparison to DKEUTS, the protocol SLWKE need not compute signature s in 
responding process from Bob to Alice where the signature s involves three modular calculations, i.e., one 
modular inversion, one modular addition and one modular multiplicative and then save the 
communicational overhead of |q|. In comparison to SAKE, the protocol SLWKE is a little heavier in 
computational cost since SAKE need not encrypt P  and replace the symmetric decryption method with 
),,( 12 kBAH
m . However, the protocol SLWKE is identical to SAKE in communicational overhead only if 
the identifier of Bob and freshness value be sent with the key material against the unknown key-share 
attack. 
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5.  Conclusion 
Comparing with DKEUTS and SAKE, the protocol SLWKE can provide resistance to traditional 
attacks and unknown key-share attack using signcryption, encryption and keyed one-way hash function. 
The protocol is identical to DKEUTS in security aspects and save computational cost by three modular 
calculations, i.e., one modular inversion, one modular addition and one modular multiplicative and 
communicational overhead by |q| in comparison to DKEUTS. Additionally the protocol protects privacy 
more effectively than SAKE do since the protocol adopts more secure mechanism than SAKE and is 
identical to SAKE in communicational overhead in considering against the unknown key-share attack. In 
the future, we plan to apply the protocol SLWKE to many more situations in wireless secure 
communications and perform more thorough analysis of the protocol to further improve the adaptability 
of the protocol. 
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